Anti-suit Injunctions in Support of Arbitration Under the Recast Brussels I Regulation by Ortolani, P.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/193689
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2020-09-10 and may be subject to
change.
 Max Planck Institute Luxembourg 
for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law 
Working Paper Series 
 
MPILux Working Paper 6 (2015) 
 
 
 
 
ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF ARBITRATION 
UNDER THE RECAST BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
 
 
 
 
PIETRO ORTOLANI 
Max Planck Institute Luxembourg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All rights reserved 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form  
without permission of the authors 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ISSN: 2309-0227 
© 
  
Working Papers are issued at the responsibility of their authors, and do not  
reflect views of the MPI Luxembourg, the Max Planck Society, or associated personnel.  
  
Max Planck Institute Luxembourg 
Luxembourg, 2014 
Luxembourg 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cite as: 
ORTOLANI, Pietro (2015), ‘ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF ARBITRATION UNDER THE RECAST BRUSSELS I REGULATION’,  
MPILux Working Paper 6, available at: www.mpi.lu
 
 
Max Planck Institute Luxembourg 
Working Paper Series 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The article investigates whether, under the Recast Brussels I Regulation, anti-suit 
injunctions should still be regarded as incompatible with EU law. The paper proceeds in three 
parts: firstly, it analyses the problem of the compatibility of anti-suit injunction with the Recast 
Regulation in general. It is argued that anti-suit injunction should still be regarded as incompatible 
with EU law since they hinder the unification of the rules of conflict of jurisdiction, thus 
undermining the effectiveness of the Brussels I system. Secondly, the article addresses the specific 
case where the anti-suit injunction has been issued by arbitrators in the form of an arbitral award. 
The article contends that the same problems of compatibility with Brussels I arise, irrespective of 
whether the injunction has been issued by a State court or by an arbitral tribunal. Thirdly, the 
relevance of the principle of mutual trust is scrutinized: in this context, it is argued that Member 
State courts can deny recognition and enforcement of an anti-suit injunction issued in the form of 
an arbitral award on grounds of public policy. 
KEYWORDS: Brussels I Regulation (recast); Anti-suit Injunctions; Arbitration; West Tankers; 
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1. Introduction 
Anti-suit injunctions are commonly regarded as an effective means to preserve an 
arbitration agreement.1 However, in West Tankers2 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) found that such measures are incompatible with 
Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I).3 The case, which goes to the core of the 
problematic relationship between arbitration and court litigation in the EU,4 
triggered an articulate debate, which resulted in the adoption of Regulation 
1215/2012 (Recast Brussels I Regulation or Recast).5 
Although some proposals discussed the possibility of including arbitration within 
the scope of application of Brussels I,6 the Recast Regulation eventually adopted a 
minimalist approach: the arbitration exclusion is maintained at Article 1(2)(d) and 
its scope of application is clarified by Recital 12. In addition, Article 73(2) 
expressly enshrines the prevalence of the New York Convention over the 
Regulation. 
                                                                
1 Julian D.M. Lew, QC and Melissa Holm, ‘Development of the Arbitral System in England’ in 
Julian D.M. Lew, QC, Harris Bor, Gregory Fullelove and Joanne Greenaway (eds), Arbitration in 
England (Kluwer 2013) 1, 11; Lord Collins of Mapesbury (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) vol 1, 867-873. See in general on the nature 
and the effects of an anti-suit injunction Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (Oxford 2012). 
2 Case No C-185/07 Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc. 
[2009] ECR I-663, (‘West Tankers’). 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1. 
4 For a comprehensive overview of such relationship see Massimo Benedettelli, 
‘‘Communitarization’ of International Arbitration: A New Spectre Haunting Europe?’ (2011) 
27(4) Arb Int’l 583. 
5 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Recast) [2012] OJ L351/1. 
6 Burkhard Hess, Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser, Study JLS/C4/2005/03, ‘Report on the 
Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf> 50 (accessed 20 
January 2015); Hans van Houtte, ‘Why Not Include Arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction 
Regulation?’ 21(4) Arb Int’l (2005) 509; Paul Jenard, ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction 
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters signed at Brussels, 27 
September 1968’ [1979] OJ C-59. See also the proposals put forth by the EU Commission: ‘Green 
Paper on the Review of the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’, COM(2009) 175 
final <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0175:FIN:EN:PDF> 
(accessed 20 January 2015); ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters’, COM(2010) 748 final, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/com_2010_748_en.pdf> (accessed 20 January 
2015); E Lein, The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (BIICL 2012). 
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This article investigates whether, under the Recast Regulation, anti-suit 
injunctions should still be regarded as incompatible with the Brussels I system. 
The practical relevance of this problem was demonstrated recently by the 
Gazprom case, where the Lithuanian Supreme Court asked the CJEU to determine 
whether a Member State court can deny recognition and enforcement of an award 
which ‘restricts the right of the national court to decide on its own jurisdiction and 
powers in a case which falls within the jurisdiction of the Brussels I Regulation’.7  
The paper proceeds in three parts: firstly, it will analyse the problem of the 
compatibility of anti-suit injunctions with the Recast Regulation in general. It will 
be argued that anti-suit injunctions should still be regarded as incompatible with 
EU law since they hinder the unification of the rules of conflict of jurisdiction, 
thus undermining the effectiveness of the Brussels I system. Secondly, the article 
will address the specific case where the anti-suit injunction has been issued by an 
arbitral tribunal in the form of an arbitral award. The article will contend that the 
same problems of compatibility with Brussels I system arise, irrespective of 
whether the injunction has been issued by a State court or by an arbitral tribunal. 
Thirdly, the relevance of the principle of mutual trust will be scrutinized: in this 
context, it will be argued that Member State courts can deny recognition and 
enforcement of an anti-suit injunction issued in the form of an arbitral award on 
grounds of public policy. 
2. Incompatibility of Anti-Suit Injunctions with the Recast Regulation: 
Clarifying the Boundaries of the Arbitration Exclusion 
2.1. Possible Arguments in Favour of Anti-Suit Injunctions under the Recast 
Regulation 
The second paragraph of Recital 12 of the Recast aims at resolving one of the 
problems arising out of the interpretation national courts gave West Tankers, 
whereby a judgment declaring that the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed would circulate under Brussels I.8 
Under the Recast Regulation such problems cannot arise, as the ruling on the 
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement is not entitled to circulation, 
                                                                
7 Request for preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 
14 October 2013, Case C-536/13 ‘Gazprom’ OAO v Republic of Lithuania. 
8 National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion SA (The Wadi Sudr) [2009] EWCA Civ 1397; 
[2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 193; in France, a different approach was adopted in Legal Department du 
Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Irak v Sociétés Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani, 
Finmeccanica et Armamenti e Aerospazio, 15 June 2006, Cour d'appel de Paris (2007) 1 Rev Arb 
87. 
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irrespective of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an 
incidental question. In light of this it could be argued that the Recast extends the 
scope of the arbitration exclusion, imposing a complete separation between the 
evaluation as to the existence of a valid arbitration clause, on the one hand, and 
the Brussels I system, on the other hand. In other words one could reason that, 
since the Member State court judgment ruling on the arbitration agreement is not 
entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Recast, an anti-suit injunction 
could not possibly undermine the effectiveness of Brussels I, since it aims at 
preventing a court judgment which is in any case covered by the new, reinforced 
arbitration exclusion. 
In addition, an argument in favour of the possibility of anti-suit injunctions under 
the Recast Regulation could be found in Paragraph 4 of Recital 12, which 
excludes ancillary proceedings in support of arbitration from the scope of 
application of Brussels I. Since an anti-suit injunction aims, in this context, at 
preserving the effectivity of an arbitration agreement, it could be argued that 
Paragraph 4 extends the scope of the arbitration exclusion, thus ruling out the 
applicability of West Tankers to the Recast Regulation. 
2.2. Ongoing Incompatibility of Anti-Suit Injunctions With the Brussels I 
System: The Role of Recital 12 
The above arguments cannot be accepted. It would be wrong to derive such 
drastic consequences from a Recital, which is not a binding provision of the 
Regulation: had the EU legislators wanted to radically reform the Brussels I 
system and exclude the applicability of West Tankers to the Recast Regulation, 
they would have altered the actual provisions, rather than simply including a more 
detailed Recital.9 Since Recitals merely provide guidance as to how a Regulation 
should be interpreted10 it must be concluded that, in the absence of relevant 
changes to the binding provisions of Brussels I, Recital 12 could at best be read as 
suggesting the desirability of some limited amendments as to how the Regulation 
                                                                
9 According to Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen, ‘The Recast Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration: 
Revisited or Revised?’ (2014) 30(1) Arb Int’l 169, 184, ‘the Recast Regulation seeks to maintain 
and clarify the status quo with regard to the arbitration exclusion’. 
10 ‘Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons 
involved in the drafting of legislation within the Community institutions’ 
<http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/joint_practical_guide_en.pdf> (accessed 20 January 
2015). 
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should be applied in practice, but cannot be invoked as the demonstration of a 
radical legislative change.11 
Analogously, the exclusion of ancillary proceedings set forth in Paragraph 4 of 
Recital 12 seems to be irrelevant as far as the interplay between anti-suit 
injunctions and Brussels I is concerned: even under Regulation 44/2001 the CJEU 
has excluded ancillary proceedings from the scope of application of Brussels I.12 
Furthermore, the process of recast was triggered by the debate regarding the West 
Tankers case, which focused on anti-suit injunctions. From this perspective it is 
highly symptomatic that Paragraph 4 contains a list of ancillary proceedings, but 
does not mention anti-suit injunctions. This legislative choice must be seen as a 
deliberate omission, since the legislative debate which led to Regulation 
1215/2012 revolved largely around the problem of the admissibility of anti-suit 
injunctions.  
The only logical explanation to such omission is that the EU lawmaker did not 
intend Recital 12 as having revolutionary effects on the West Tankers 
interpretation of the relationship between Brussels I and anti-suit injunctions 
issued in favour of arbitration. In any case, in order to determine whether anti-suit 
injunctions undermine the effectivity of Brussels I, it is necessary to enlarge the 
perspective and evaluate whether these measures hinder the attainment of the 
objectives of the Regulation. West Tankers did not question that anti-suit 
injunctions issued in support of arbitration have an ancillary function and thus do 
not fall within the direct scope of application of the Regulation. However, in order 
to assess whether a limitation of effectiveness of EU law occurs, it is necessary to 
evaluate the effects of an anti-suit injunction on the court proceedings (falling 
within the scope of application of Brussels I) which the injunction aims at 
preventing. 
According to West Tankers, proceedings which do not come within the scope of 
Brussels I ‘may nevertheless have consequences which undermine its 
effectiveness’, with regard to the attainment of two distinct objectives: not only 
the ‘free movement of decisions’, but also the ‘unification of the rules of conflict 
                                                                
11 Relying on similar arguments, some commentators advocate a particularly restrictive 
interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Recital 12: according to Guido Carducci, ‘The New EU 
Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and International Arbitration: With 
Notes on Parallel Arbitration, Court Proceedings and the EU Commission’s Proposal’ (2013) 
29(3) Arb Int’l 467, 472-473, the Recital only excludes the applicability of the rules on recognition 
and enforcement, but not the lis pendens mechanism. 
12 Case No C-190/89 Marc Rich & Co. AG v Società Italiana Impianti PA [1991] ECR I-3855, 
(‘Marc Rich’). 
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of jurisdiction’.13 In this perspective, the argument whereby Paragraph 2 of the 
Recast Regulation reinforces the arbitration exclusion is insufficient, as it is only 
applicable as far as the free movement of decisions is concerned.  
2.3. Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Effectivity of the Brussels I System 
On the one hand it is true that, from the point of view of the free movement of 
decisions, an anti-suit injunction issued in support of arbitration does not directly 
curtail the effectiveness of the Recast, as the court judgment stating that no valid 
arbitration agreement exists would not be entitled to circulation in any case. On 
the other hand, though, the injunction hinders the attainment of the second 
objective, i.e. the creation of a unified system for the allocation of jurisdiction, as 
it makes it impossible for Member State courts not only to rule on the existence 
and validity of an arbitration agreement, but also to assess their own jurisdiction. 
Inasmuch as the main subject matter falls within the scope of application of the 
Regulation, each Member State Court is put on an equal footing and cannot be 
deprived of the power to assess its own jurisdiction under the Regulation. Hence, 
anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the Recast Regulation because they 
prevent Member State courts not only from deciding whether a valid arbitration 
agreement exists, but also from subsequently applying the rules on the allocation 
of jurisdiction set forth in the Regulation.14 
                                                                
13 (n 2), para. 24. 
14 Apparently, it could be argued that the evaluation of the existence and validity of the arbitration 
agreement is separated from the assessment of jurisdiction under the Regulation. However, such 
view is only valid in jurisdictions where the doctrine of competence-competence has not only a 
positive effect, but also a negative one, thus preventing State courts from ruling on the arbitration 
agreement, in order to preserve the autonomy of arbitration. In this context, it could be argued that 
the two preliminary questions (the one relating to the arbitration agreement and the one concerning 
the allocation of jurisdiction under Brussels I) are legally and logically detached from each other. 
However, in the EU, the negative effect of competence-competence is only recognised in France 
and cannot thus be invoked, since the problem at hand involves EU law and cannot be resolved by 
relying on the specificity of the arbitration statute of a single Member State. Hence, adopting the 
dominant view whereby the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz only has a positive effect, there is 
no doubt that an anti-suit injunction (albeit rendered in support of an arbitration agreement) should 
be seen as having an impact on the possibility for Member State courts to evaluate their own 
jurisdiction, thus limiting the effectivity of Brussels I. Whenever one of the parties raises an 
exceptio compromissi before a State court, the problem of the existence and validity of the 
arbitration agreement becomes part of the question which the court needs to answer, in order to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. In this perspective, thus, it is 
obvious that if the State court is deprived of the power to rule on the arbitration agreement, it is 
also prevented from assessing whether it has jurisdiction. Since in the EU context such assessment 
is done through the application of the provisions on the allocation of jurisdiction set forth in 
Brussels I, it must be concluded that an anti-suit injunction hinders the effectivity of that part of 
the Regulation creating a uniform system of conflict of jurisdiction, which every Member State 
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The above analysis leads to a first conclusion: the contents of Recital 12 of the 
Recast Regulation are not enough ground to rule out the incompatibility between 
anti-suit injunctions ordered in support of arbitration and the Brussels I system. 
On the contrary, even under the Recast, the attainment of the objective of the 
unification of the rules of conflict of jurisdiction is undermined by a measure 
whereby Member State courts are deprived of the power to determine whether 
they have jurisdiction under the Regulation.15 The opposite view, according to 
which an anti-suit injunction is a personal measure directed to the parties and 
therefore does not interfere with court jurisdiction, must be rejected as merely 
formalistic:16 in the words of Lord Scarman in British Airways Board v Laker 
Airways Ltd,  
‘an injunction restraining a person within the jurisdiction of the English court 
from pursuing a remedy in a foreign court where, if he proves the necessary 
facts, he has a cause of action is, however disguised and indirect, an interference 
with the process of justice in that foreign court’. 17 
3. Anti-suit injunctions in the Form of Arbitral Awards 
3.1. Specific Problems Arising Out of Arbitral Anti-suit Injunctions 
The question whether, under the Recast Regulation, arbitral tribunals can issue an 
anti-suit injunction in the form of an arbitral award will be answered by the CJEU 
                                                                                                                                                                               
court must have the possibility to apply autonomously. Furthermore, an anti-suit injunction 
interferes with the sovereign power of Member State courts to issue a judgment on the merits, 
which would circulate under the Recast Regulation irrespective of whether a party has invoked the 
existence of an arbitration agreement as an objection to jurisdiction in the course of the 
proceedings. The circumstance that such objection has been raised has no effect on the circulation 
of the judgment on the merits, which will be issued in case the Court concludes that no valid 
arbitration agreement exists. This way, Paragraph 3 of the Recast Regulation avoids the 
undesirable prospect of a ‘super torpedo’: Peter Arnt Nielsen, ‘The Recast of the Brussels I 
Regulation’ in Michael Joachim Bonell, Marie Louise Holle and Peter Arnt Nielsen (eds), Liber 
Amicorum Ole Lando (DJØF 2012) 257, 273; Martin Illmer, ‘Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited 
– The European Commission’s Proposal COM(2010) 748 final –‘ (2011) 75(3) RabelsZ 645, 666; 
Richard Fentimann, ‘Arbitration in Europe: Immunity or Regulation?’ (2011) 1 Int’l J Proc L 151. 
15 Similar views are expressed by Simon P Camilleri, ‘Recital 12 of the Recast Regulation: a New 
Hope?’ (2013) 4 ICLQ 899, 904-905; Andreas Estrup Ippolito and Morten Adler-Nissen, ‘West 
Tankers revisited: has the new Brussels I Regulation brought anti-suit injunctions back into the 
procedural armoury?’ (2013) 79(2) Arb 158, 168-170. 
16 Adrian Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford 2014) 390 states that an 
anti-suit injunction ‘looks very much like an act of interference with proceedings before (a) 
foreign court, and the appearance really does not mislead’; according to Neil Andrews, Andrews 
on Civil Process (Intersentia 2013) vol 2, 229 ‘(a)lthough the respondent is the only party subject 
to the injunction, it might be perceived that the foreign court is indirectly affected’. 
17 British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd  [1985] A.C. 58, 95.  
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in the near future in the aforementioned Gazprom case.18 Whilst the questions 
referred to the CJEU focus on whether such award can be denied recognition and 
enforcement by Member State courts, this part of the article enlarges the 
perspective and discusses three interrelated problems. First of all, it will be 
necessary to investigate whether arbitrators have jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit 
injunction. Secondly, the paper will assess whether an anti-suit injunction issued 
in the form of an award can be considered as an award for the purposes of the 
New York Convention. Thirdly, the problem of recognition and enforcement of 
the arbitral anti-suit injunction (as occurring in Gazprom) will be scrutinized. In 
this context, the paper will investigate the differences between anti-suit 
injunctions issued by State courts and arbitral tribunals. It will be argued that the 
conclusion reached in the previous paragraph, whereby problems of compatibility 
with the Brussels I system still exist after the Recast, remains applicable 
notwithstanding of the circumstance that the measure was issued by an arbitral 
tribunal. 
3.2. Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals to Issue Anti-suit Injunctions 
It is debatable whether arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit 
injunction. The solution to this problem largely depends on the nature and the 
effects of the arbitration agreement; in this regard, two different theories must be 
considered. According to the first theory, which could be qualified as 
‘procedural’, the arbitration agreement simply confers on the arbitrators the power 
to assess autonomously whether they have jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the 
case (kompetenz-kompetenz), but does not entail the power to enjoin parties from 
starting court litigation.19 In other words, the arbitrators can invoke the arbitration 
agreement to claim their own jurisdiction, but not to impose a prohibition on the 
parties, preventing them from filing an action before State courts in breach of the 
arbitration agreement. In case litigation is started, it will be up to State courts to 
decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to arbitration, as required by Article II(3) 
of the New York Convention. 
According to the second theory, which could be described as ‘contractual’, the 
arbitration agreement is a contract between the parties and the arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of it. Therefore, the existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement empowers the arbitrators not only to claim jurisdiction over 
                                                                
18 (n 7). It must be noted, however, that the Recast Regulation is not directly applicable ratione 
temporis to the Gazprom case. 
19 Laurent Lévy, ‘Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators’ in Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Suit 
Injunctions in International Arbitration (JURIS 2005) 115. 
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cases arising out of the main substantive legal relationship which the agreement 
refers to, but also to order the performance of the agreement in kind.20 From this 
point of view, when issuing an award containing an anti-suit injunction, the 
tribunal would mandate the enforcement of a contract over which it has 
jurisdiction.  
The contractual theory has been criticized in the civil law world, as it constructs 
the arbitration agreement as a substantive contract between the parties, whereby 
the arbitrators are given the powers to exclude the jurisdiction of State courts or 
other arbitral tribunals. On the contrary, it has been argued that 
‘(j)urisdiction is something that is declared, not something that can be ordered. 
Declaring jurisdiction enables the arbitrator to rule on the merits of the dispute 
before him but does not comprise the power to exclude the jurisdiction of 
others’.21 
The above analysis evinces that the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to issue anti-
suit injunctions is only conceivable in legal systems where the arbitration 
agreement is seen as a contract between the parties, whose performance in kind 
can be ordered by the arbitrators. By contrast, if the arbitration clause is qualified 
as a procedural agreement between the parties, the problem of an arbitral anti-suit 
injunction should in principle never arise. In this perspective, arbitrators can claim 
jurisdiction, but they cannot exclude the jurisdiction of State courts by means of 
an injunction to the parties: it will be up to State courts to mandatorily refer the 
parties to arbitration, whenever litigation is commenced in breach of a valid 
arbitration agreement. 
3.3. Circulation of Anti-suit Injunctions Issued in the Form of an Award Under 
the New York Convention 
The second question to be answered is whether an anti-suit injunction issued in 
the form of an award qualifies as an award for the purposes of circulation under 
                                                                
20 Robert Merkin and Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (5th edn, Informa 2014) 187-188: 
‘(t)he judicial basis of the injunction is the enforcement of both a positive right to have any 
disputes resolved only by way of the contractually agreed forum (arbitration proceedings), and a 
closely related but legally distinct and concomitant negative right not to be sued in any other 
forum. When viewed as obligations, the negative-positive dichotomy is reversed, but is still one 
way of looking at the issue – there is a positive obligation to bring proceedings by way of the 
contractually agreed forum (arbitration), which carries with it the negative obligation not to bring 
proceedings in another forum’. 
21 Lévy (n 19) 120. Similarly Massimo V. Benedettelli, ‘Le anti-suit injunctions nell’arbitrato 
internazionale: questioni di legittimità e opportunità’ (2014) 4 Riv Arb 701, 713 argues that, 
although the arbitration agreement is a contract, it is predominantly procedural in nature and 
cannot thus be regulated by ordinary contract law.  
 13 
 
the New York Convention. In this regard it must be taken into account that the 
New York Convention aims at ensuring the circulation of awards which 
adjudicate in a final and binding way on claims brought by the parties and relating 
to their substantive rights. By contrast, an award cannot be considered final in the 
sense of the New York Convention when it merely serves the ancillary function of 
preserving the status quo, but does not resolve any dispute relating to substantive 
rights which has arisen between the parties.22  
There is little doubt that an award consisting of the order to refrain from starting 
or continuing litigation before a State court in breach of the arbitration agreement 
does not serve the purpose of resolving a dispute in a final and binding fashion, 
but rather aims at preserving the effectivity of the agreement, in view of already 
pending or future possible claims relating to the main substantive legal 
relationship. Hence, such measure is formally qualified as an award, but has the 
nature of an ancillary measure issued in support of arbitration: for this reason, 
there are good reasons to argue that recognition and enforcement could be denied 
by simply arguing that the New York Convention does not apply to the case at 
hand.23  
3.4. Incompatibility with the Recast Brussels I Regulation and Enforceability 
of the Measure 
Even if the State court before which recognition and enforcement are sought 
qualified the injunction as an award for the purposes of the New York 
Convention, this would not be enough ground to conclude that the award is 
entitled to circulate. The previous paragraph of this article has argued that anti-
suit injunctions are incompatible with the Recast Regulation; it is now necessary 
to determine whether the same conclusions remain applicable, if the measure has 
been issued by an arbitral tribunal, as is the case in Gazprom.  
Apparently problems of compatibility do not arise in this specific context, since 
arbitral tribunals (unlike State courts) do not have the power to coercively enforce 
the measure: it has been argued that arbitrators would not be able to impose 
compliance by means of sanctions, whilst a party ignoring a UK court-ordered 
                                                                
22 Resort Condominiums International, Inc v Ray Bolwell and others, XX YBCA 628 (1995) 
(Supreme Court of Queensland, 29 October 1993). Similar views are expressed by Bernd Ehle, 
‘Article I [Scope of Application]’ in Reinmar Wolff (ed), New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards – Commentary (Beck 2012) 26, 48.  
23 Similar doubts are cast by Antonio Leandro, 'Towards a New Interface Between Brussels I and 
Arbitration?' (2015) 1 JIDS 188, 198. 
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anti-suit injunction could be in contempt of court and suffer the ensuing 
consequences.24 The above argument cannot be accepted, for three reasons.  
Firstly, the arbitral tribunal is able to punish the party commencing or continuing 
litigation in breach of the arbitration agreement by awarding compensation: 25 it is 
important to notice that the possibility to order the compensation of damages 
arising out of the violation of the anti-suit injunction is not merely theoretical, but 
on the contrary clearly emerges from arbitral case-law.26 In addition, even in cases 
where the anti-suit injunction is the sole purpose of the arbitration, were one to 
accede to the ‘contractual’ theory, it would be possible for the party lamenting a 
violation of the arbitration agreement to file a separate action and claim 
compensation. Thus, although non-compliance with the injunction cannot give 
rise to contempt of court, compensation can be claimed in case of violation of the 
injunction.  
Secondly, even more arguments in favour of the enforceability of an anti-suit 
injunction issued in the form of an arbitral award may be found, when analyzing 
the contents of the applicable lex arbitri: the latter could set forth additional 
mechanisms for the enforcement of an arbitral anti-suit injunction.27  
Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to 
issue an anti-suit injunction relies upon the ‘contractual’ theory, whereby 
performance in kind of the arbitration agreement can be ordered. Hence, the 
arbitral award including an anti-suit injunction should be seen as a decision 
                                                                
24 Trevor C Hartley, ‘The Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration’ (2014) 4 ICLQ 843, 856-857. See 
also written questions of the French Government to the questions put by the Court in the Gazprom 
case (n 7), as referred to in the Opinion of AG Wathelet, para 66. 
25 According to Philip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd v Bamberger [1997] I.L.Pr. 73, 117, 
when evaluating the effects of anti-suit injunctions in a cross-border scenario, it is necessary to 
consider whether the injunction can circulate and be recognized by courts of other States. Hence, if 
the injunction is rendered in the form of an arbitral award, it is wrong to argue that its violation 
would have no consequence, simply because the party could not be held in contempt of court. 
Rather, it is necessary to take into account the means through which compliance with the 
injunction could be imposed: in this context compensation can be used as an instrument of indirect 
enforcement, similarly to an astreinte. In presence of a transnational legal relationship, this 
remedy could be even more effective than contempt of court, as the party starting litigation in 
breach of the arbitration agreement can suffer the negative consequences of an arbitral decision 
awarding compensation and circulating under the New York Convention, irrespective of where it 
is located. 
26 Final award of April 1997 in ICC case No. 8887 (2000) 11(1) ICC Bull 91, 94, cited by Lévy (n 
19) 127. 
27 By way of example, the possibility of an arbitral tribunal subjecting its orders to criminal 
sanctions has been at least contemplated by the arbitration scholarship in Switzerland: see Gerhard 
Walter, Wolfgang Bosch and Jürgen Brönnimann, Internationale Shiedsgerichtbarkeit in der 
Schweiz - Kommentar zu Kapitel 12 des IPR-Gesetzes (Stämpfli 1991) 137. 
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imposing a negative obligation (in particular, an obligation to refrain from starting 
or continuing litigation before State courts in breach of the arbitration agreement). 
Such theoretical framework entails that, once the award has been recognized, it 
becomes an enforceable title, enshrining the aforementioned negative obligation: 
in jurisdictions where the judge supervising the enforcement has the authority to 
order coercive measures, therefore, additional means to enforce the award may be 
available. 
Therefore, it must be concluded that the differences between a court-issued anti-
suit injunctions and a measure of the same kind issued in the form of the arbitral 
award are not enough ground to rule out problems of compatibility with the 
Recast Brussels I Regulation in the latter scenario. On the contrary, the possibility 
to enforce an arbitral anti-suit injunction clearly suggests that the same problems 
arise, irrespective of whether the measure has been issued by a State court or by 
an arbitral tribunal. 
4. Mutual Trust and Public Policy 
The analysis carried out in the previous paragraphs has demonstrated that an anti-
suit injunction, issued either by a court or by an arbitral tribunal, undermines the 
effectiveness of the Recast Brussels I Regulation, as it hinders the attainment of 
the objective of unifying the rules on conflicts of jurisdiction. This, of course, 
does not per se amount to concluding that an anti-suit injunction issued in the 
form of an award could be denied recognition and enforcement under Article 
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. In order to answer this question, it is 
necessary to determine whether the aforementioned incompatibility between anti-
suit injunctions and the Brussels I system can be interpreted as a violation of 
public policy. 
The Brussels I system is governed by the principle of mutual trust, whereby all 
Member State courts must be considered equal and trusted to apply the Regulation 
correctly. An anti-suit injunction is clearly at odds with mutual trust, since it aims 
at avoiding the risk that the State court seized in breach of an arbitration 
agreement may incorrectly claim jurisdiction;28 mutual trust, on the contrary, 
requires Member State courts to assume that the assessment of jurisdiction 
performed by a different Member State court is correct.  
From the point of view of the Member State court before which recognition and 
enforcement of the arbitral anti-suit injunction are sought, the circumstance that 
                                                                
28 Miguel Gómez Jene, ‘Arbitraje internacional y Reglamento Bruselas I Refundido’ (2015) 1 
Arbitraje 15, 44. 
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an arbitral tribunal is not a Member State court and thus is not directly bound by 
mutual trust is irrelevant. In this regard, what matters is the subject matter 
criterion as applied by the CJEU in Van Uden29 and West Tankers:30 inasmuch as 
the main subject matter of the court proceedings which the injunction aims at 
avoiding falls within the scope of application of Brussels I, the injunction is 
incompatible with mutual trust, irrespective of the authority which has issued it. 
Therefore, it must be determined whether the principle of mutual trust has public 
policy status under EU law.31 
The CJEU has clearly stated that mutual trust is a principle of fundamental 
importance in EU law: 
‘the principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental 
importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be 
created and maintained’.32   
According to the principle of mutual trust, every Member State is deemed to be 
compliant with EU law. When applied to Brussels I, mutual trust entails that the 
application of the rules on conflict of jurisdiction by Member State courts must be 
trusted as correct. The primary relevance of mutual trust in the Recast Regulation 
is evinced by Article 45(3), whereby ‘the test of public policy (…) may not be 
applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction’. Article 45(3) thus imposes an absolute 
presumption: the first Court’s assessment of jurisdiction must always be regarded 
as compatible with public policy and the requested Member State Court is bound 
to accept it.  
The absolute presumption set forth in Article 45(3) is the result of a balancing 
choice of the EU lawmaker, whereby the scope of application of the public policy 
exception is limited in order to protect a competing value. This value is, 
undeniably, mutual trust. In order to justify the legislative choice of Article 45(3) 
it is necessary to conclude that the principle of mutual trust has public policy 
status, as the scope of application of Article 45(1)(a) could not be restricted 
invoking provisions which do not share the same status. 
In conclusion, in light of the importance that the EU lawmaker and the Court of 
Justice confer upon mutual trust, a Member State court could invoke such 
principle to deny recognition and enforcement of an anti-suit injunction issued in 
the form of an arbitral award under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. 
                                                                
29 Case C-391/95 Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line [1998] ECR I-7091. 
30 (n 2). 
31 According to Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1997] 
ECR I-3055, EU public policy must be accorded the same relevance as domestic public policy by 
Member State courts. 
32 Opinion of the Court (Full Court) 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para 191. 
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5. Conclusions 
Anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the Recast Brussels I Regulation, as 
they deprive Member State courts of the power to assess their own jurisdiction 
under the Regulation. Hence, the rationale of West Tankers continues to be 
applicable: the effectivity of EU law is undermined, inasmuch as Member State 
courts are prevented not only from deciding whether a valid arbitration agreement 
exists, but also from subsequently applying the rules on the allocation of 
jurisdiction set forth in the Regulation. 
It is debatable whether arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit 
injunction. Such jurisdiction is only conceivable if the arbitration agreement is 
seen as a contract between the parties, whose performance in kind can be ordered 
by the tribunal. By contrast, if the arbitration clause is qualified as a procedural 
agreement, arbitrators can claim jurisdiction, but they cannot exclude the 
jurisdiction of State courts by means of an injunction to the parties. 
In case the anti-suit injunction has been issued by an arbitral tribunal in the form 
of an award, it could be argued that it is not entitled to recognition and 
enforcement under the New York Convention, as the measure does not adjudicate 
in a final and binding way on claims brought by the parties and relating to their 
substantive rights and therefore fails to qualify as an award for the purposes of the 
Convention. However, even if one were to apply the New York Convention to an 
anti-suit injunction issued in the form of an award, recognition and enforcement 
can be denied in light of the incompatibility of the measure with the Brussels I 
system. From this point of view, it must be considered that the differences 
between a court-issued anti-suit injunction and a measure of the same kind issued 
in the form of the arbitral award are not enough ground to rule out problems of 
compatibility with the Recast Brussels I Regulation in the latter scenario. Even in 
the absence of remedies such as contempt of court, the party commencing or 
continuing litigation in breach of the arbitration agreement could be found under 
an obligation to pay compensation for such violation. Hence, the argument 
whereby an arbitral anti-suit injunction is not incompatible with Brussels I 
because it cannot be enforced must be rejected. 
Anti-suit injunctions are at odds with the principle of mutual trust, as they aim at 
avoiding the risk that the State court seized in breach of an arbitration agreement 
may incorrectly claim jurisdiction; mutual trust, on the contrary, makes it 
necessary to assume that the assessment of jurisdiction performed by a different 
Member State court is correct. Since mutual trust is regarded by the CJEU as a 
fundamental principle of EU law, recognition and enforcement of an anti-suit 
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injunction issued in the form of an award could be denied under Article V(2)(b) of 
the New York Convention. 
